In historical accounts of the world economic crisis of the 1930s, Switzerland is known for its staunch defense of the gold standard and the rise of corporatist policies. Yet, so far, the literature has not discussed the implications of these 
Introduction
Recent research has shown that Switzerland's dismal performance during the 1930s was mainly due to its exchange rate policy . Thanks to a high gold cover ratio, the Swiss National Bank was able to defend the old parity against any speculative attack, thus preventing an early devaluation of the Swiss franc that would have restored the competitiveness of Switzerland's exporting sectors. This exchange rate policy was motivated by a variety of reasons, yet the widespread gold standard mentality certainly played a key role. The strong belief that a devaluation would lead to inflation and that the gold standard was the only reliable guarantee for prosperity and stability, led economies to stay on gold as long as possible -a decision which implied a lagged recovery from the Great Depression (e.g. Balderston, 2003; Feinstein et al., 2008) .
1 As (Straumann, 2010, p. 129-142) shows, this was also the case for Switzerland. Only when the last major trading partner, France (see Table 1 ), decided to devalue its currency, Switzerland was ready to change course. In September 1936, the Swiss franc was devalued by 30 percent.
To demonstrate the consequence of Switzerland's defense of the gold standard, we adapt the famous "contracting spiral of world trade"-graph, first published by the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research (Österreichisches Institut für Konjunkturforschung) in 1933 (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995) , to Swiss exports (Figure 1) . Real exports fell by 50 percent until June 1932, followed by a weak recovery to about 60-70 percent of the October 1929 level. The consequence of the decision to join the Gold Bloc in 1933 (together with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland) was that exports stayed at this level until end of 1936. Due to the overvalued Swiss franc, the Swiss exporting sectors profited less from the recovery of the world economy than small European countries with a devalued currency such as the Scandinavian countries.
1 "A further aspect of great significance was the widespread belief in financial and political circles that it was essential to return to the pre-war gold standard if the growth and prosperity of the pre-1914 era were to be re-established, whatever the sacrifices their countries would have to make in oder to force down wages and prices so that the pre-war value of the currency could be restored." (Feinstein et al., 2008, p. 1) The Swiss National Bank's defense of the old gold parity was particularly detrimental as Switzerland's prices were extraordinarily sticky during this period. As a matter of fact, regulations protecting individual economic sectors and fixing prices dramatically increased during the crisis. Instead of enabling the downward adjustment, the government sought to cushion the negative effects of an overvalued currency by containing competition. Almost any pressure group, in particular Swiss farmers, was able to obtain protection and subsidies. In many historical accounts, the rise of these corporatist policies in the 1930s has been hailed as the beginning of a fruitful cooperation between capital and labor. But in the context of an orthodox gold standard policy, these rigidities proved to be fatal. Therefore, understanding the nature of Switzerland's economic crisis during the 1930s requires not only a thorough analysis of the exchange rate policy, but also a better grasp of how prices adjusted before and after 1929.
Besides the exchange rate policy and the stickiness of prices, there is a third feature defining the course of Switzerland's economic crisis. The ample gold reserves may have prevented the Swiss National Bank from leaving the gold standard at an early state of the crisis. But on the other hand, they also allowed the central bank to refrain from increasing interest rates in the face of speculative attacks.
From 1931 to 1936 when the devaluation enabled the central bank to reflate the economy nominal interests remained close to zero. By contrast, Belgium and France, which also defended the gold standard until the mid-1930s were forced to increase their interest rates whenever investors mistrusted their currencies. Thus, the usual constraints of the gold standard did not apply until 1936 for the case of Switzerland.
In this paper, we try to account for these different aspects of the Swiss crisis.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide a new monthly dataset covering the performance of the real economy from January 1926 to December 1938. Second, we estimate the structural parameters of a New Keynesian small open economy model for Switzerland in the spirit of Clarida et al. (2000 Clarida et al. ( , 2001 and Galí and Monacelli (2005) , going beyond the calibration exercise in . We explicitly take into account the fact that Switzerland was not forced to increase nominal interest rates during the Gold Bloc period due to the massive gold inflow starting with the German crisis in June 1931 and intensifying after Britain went off gold.
Following Ireland (2004) , the model incorporates a vector autoregressive measurement error component capturing the dynamics in the data which are not represented by the economic part. This feature allows to assess the model's suitability for the data under analysis. Moreover, it is possible to compare the relative importance of the structural shocks (foreign demand shock and terms of trade shock) with the contribution of the measurement error block by looking at the decomposition of the forecast error variance. The results show that the economic part of the model contributes a significant variance share. The structural approach enables us to embark on a counterfactual experiment by simulating the Swiss economy in the case of a devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1931, the month at which the UK left gold.
Our results show that the terms of trade shock played an important role for the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period. While foreign demand was recovering after 1932, the terms of trade further deteriorated. Consequently, the latter effect dominated the foreign demand impulse and led to a long lasting recession, which only ended when Switzerland left gold in September 1936. As a result, our counterfactual analysis implies that in case of an earlier devaluation of the Swiss franc, the economy would have recovered a lot faster and reached its steady state level shortly after leaving gold: the decision to defend the parity turned out to be extremely costly.
This finding is in line with the successful recovery of Sweden after leaving gold together with the UK (Rathke et al., 2011) .
Our third contribution is that we provide a thorough discussion of how prices behaved from 1926 to 1938. In particular, we detect severe price rigidities, induced by a high degree of cartelization and regulatory measures, as an important characteristic of the Swiss economy in the Interwar Period. Moreover, our estimation results not only confirm this finding but also emphasize the cost of it. A counterfactual analysis shows that a lower degree of price stickiness would have been beneficial for the Swiss economy. This result highlights the potential benefits of an internal devaluation and the cost of corporatist policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and outlines the underlying model. In Section 3 we present the data and our estimation strategy. Section 4 discussed the results and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The underlying model corresponds to the basic New Keynesian small open economy model as introduced by Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Galí (2008) . Already in the Interwar years, the Swiss economy was characterized by a high degree of openness.
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Thus, we believe it is important to model open economy characteristics explicitly.
Moreover, we follow Calvo (1983) by modeling nominal price rigidities. This seems to be an important stylized fact for the period under analysis: a large share of domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. Not only did it own the national monopoly for mail, telegram and telephone services and the Swiss federal railway, but also began to stabilize agricultural prices in the midst of the depression (Rutz, 1970, p. 180-184) .
Price rigidities became an issue already in the 1920s, illustrated by the increasing difference between wholesale and consumer prices after the recession of 1921/22 (Kaufmann 1952 , Marbach 1952 ; see upper part of Figure 4 ). Especially the degree of cartelization of the Swiss economy was blamed for this development. 7 For the following, see Lautner (1950, p. 1-12) , Eidgenössische Zentralstelle für Kriegswirtschaft (1950, p. 877-887) , and Marbach (1952) . , 1926-1938 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 sponse to the Great Depression. Its main purpose was to monitor the influence of import restrictions on prices and to prevent unjustified price increases. In the beginning, it lacked effectiveness, because it depended heavily on voluntary cooperation.
The lower part of Figure 4 illustrates this lack of effectiveness: wholesale prices kept falling faster than consumer prices. As a consequence and in fear of inflationary pressure due to the devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1936, the Swiss parliament decided to implement direct price controls in 1936. The Preiskontrollstelle was authorized to collect necessary data and regulate prices. These regulations had two purposes: to protect consumers against unjustified price increases, and also to protect producers from price dumping. For example, milk prices were pegged by compulsory cartels and quotas, and export of watches became only possible condi-tional to complying with the price regulations of the watch industry (Hug, 1938, p. 364-366) . Almost all prices were regulated (goods and services, gas, electricity, rents), and from September 1936 on, could only be increased with official approval, and even with approval, the adjustment had to be stepwise (Hug, 1938, p. 362) .
The effectiveness of this regulatory intervention can be seen from the lower part of Notes: M1, the monetary base (BASE), the gold reserves (GOLD), and the total reserves (RES) are measured in millions of Swiss francs. The gold parity (PGOLD) corresponds to the price of one gram of gold in Swiss francs. QGOLD denotes the quantity of gold reserves in tons. Source: Swiss National Bank www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz gm/source (T1.3 and T2.2) www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz snb/source (T1.1) www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/histz snb book/source (page 31) Table 2 for further detail.
Lastly, as stated in the introduction, we do not include a gold standard mechanism. To motivate our choice of model, we follow Bernanke (1995) and decompose Swiss money supply (M 1) in the period 1922-1936 into contributions of the money multiplier (M 1/BASE, BASE: monetary base), the inverse of the gold backing ratio (BASE/RES; RES: international reserves), the ratio of international reserves to gold (RES/GOLD), and the gold reserves of the Swiss National Bank, expressed in domestic currency (GOLD = P GOLD × QGOLD):
The results reported in Table 2 and Figure Ultimately, we would like to assess whether an overvalued currency or the worldwide economic downturn was the main determinant of the long lasting recession in Switzerland. Consequently, we model both terms of trade and foreign demand as exogenous structural shocks. Using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach allows to measure over-/undervaluation of the Swiss franc and to conduct counterfactual analysis in a straightforward way. Furthermore, we study the role of price rigidities and its importance during the Interwar Period in Switzerland.
Therefore, we allow for monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. The home economy is infinitesimal small and does not affect the economy of the rest of the world, and markets are assumed to be complete, i.e. agents trade a full set of state contingent bonds. In every period, economic agents form rational expectations, the representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility, and firms maximize 
Households
The economy is populated by an infinitely lived representative household who seeks to maximize
by optimally choosing consumption C t and labor input N t . Its period t budget constraint looks as follows:
where Q t denotes the price of a one-period discount bond paying off one unit of domestic currency at time
. P t , B t , W t , σ, η, and β denote the consumer price index, bond holdings, the nominal wage, the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply, and the discount factor respectively. Moreover, we impose a standard no-Ponzi condition, lim
= 0, which implies that the period budget constraint always holds with equality. C t denotes a consumption composite index, i.e.
where C 
Moreover, P f t captures the foreign price of the foreign produced good, the preference parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a measure of home bias 8 , a > 0 governs the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, and θ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties. The household's utility maximization problem at period t can be summarized as
yielding the following two standard optimality conditions:
Equation (6) captures optimal static labor supply decision, i.e. marginal rate of substitution between labor and leisure is equal to the real wage rate, while the inter-temporal Euler equation is represented by equation (7).
Firms
Firm j produces output Y t,j using the production technology
with labor as the only input factor. Profits are maximized by minimizing costs for a given amount of output, i.e.
The resulting first order condition contains the real marginal costs of production, which is denoted by Ψ t . Since marginal costs are constant, Ψ t is also equal to the real average cost or real unit cost of production:
In equilibrium, goods market clearing implies
which implies that aggregate output Y t is fully absorbed by domestic consumption of the domestically produced good C h t and foreign consumption of the domestic good C h t . This leads to the demand functions for variety j,
P h t,j denotes the price of domestic variety j, and P h t corresponds to the price index of domestic goods.
Prices are sticky in the sense that with a probability ω firms are not allowed to optimally update their price at the beginning of the period. As stated above, price stickiness is an important stylized fact for the period under analysis: a large share of domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. The pricing mechanism used here goes back to Calvo (1983) .P h t,j denotes the price set by firm j in period t, which implies P (P h t+τ,j =P h t,j ) = ω τ . Moreover, since all firms are identical and face identical demand curves,P h t,j =P h t . Therefore, period t profit of firm j, conditional on being allowed to reset its price is
where P h t Ψ t corresponds to the nominal unit costs. Conditional on being allowed to reset its price level, firm j maximizes the expected current market value of profits while the price remains effective. In particular,
where
denotes the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs.
The first order condition with respect toP
2.3 Global Characteristics
Exchange Rate & Terms of Trade
We assume that the law of one price holds, i.e.
where P t , P f t , S t denote the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted in foreign currency, the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted in domestic currency, and the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency respectively. The real exchange rate is
and corresponds to the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic consumption bundles, while the terms of trade, the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic goods, is defined as
and follows an exogenous 9 and stationary first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process in logs,
where ρ δ < 1 characterizes the persistence parameter and σ 2 δ the variance of the shock δ t .
Foreign Country
The domestic economy is an infinitesimal small open economy whereas the foreign economy can be thought of as an aggregate of infinitely many identical infinitesimal small open economies. Therefore, in the aggregate, net exports of all foreign economies will sum up to zero, which implies C t = Y t . Foreign consumption C t is equal to foreign demand Y t , which follows an exogenous and stationary AR (1) process in logs,
with a persistence parameter ρ smaller than one and a variance σ 2 y of the shock t .
9 We are aware of the fact that this specification is not fully consistent with the underlying model, because prices are endogenously determined. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) point out that an estimation of the full structural model including endogenous terms of trade turned out to be too restrictive and therefore lead to implausible estimates. Consequently, we decided to to follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) by treating the terms of trade as an exogenous process.
International Trade
Exports are denoted in domestic goods and given by
For imports (denoted in domestic goods), we have
Net exports (denoted in domestic goods) are the difference between exports and imports,
International Risk Sharing
International risk sharing under complete markets implies that the stochastic discount factor among different countries is equal to (Chari et al., 2002 )
where P t denotes the foreign consumer price index, and which implies the following international risk sharing condition:
As a result, complete markets lead to this this simple relationship linking the real exchange rate to the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption of domestic and foreign households.
Φ t = µΦ t represents the general form of the risk sharing condition.
Without loss of generality we set the initial condition µ equal to one.
Market Clearing and Aggregate Production Function
The firm level production function is represented by
Labor market clearing implies
which enables us to compute the aggregate production function
ζ t can be seen as a measrure of price dispersion. The full set of optimality conditions can be found in Appendix A.
Data and Estimation Method
For the estimation exercise, we use monthly data of industrial production, inflation, and net exports, ranging from January 1926 to December 1938. An official industrial production index is not available before 1965 (Cascioni, 2000, p. 281 12 "Dann muss die Verbandsleitung auch mit einer Abneigung der Mitglieder rechnen, Dinge bekanntzugeben, welche die Grundlagen des Geschäfts betreffen. Diese Einstellung wäre besonders seitens der welschen Mitglieder zu gegenwärtigen, welche sich schon heuteüber einen angeblicḧ uberwuchernden 'esprit de police' der Verbände beklagen." (Marti, 1936, p. 176) 13 See the contributions by Cattani (1936) , Bühler-Krayer (1936) , Fischer (1936) , and Marti (1936) .
14 Source: SNB monthly reports (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1936) (1937) (1938) and Die Volkswirtschaft (1930 Volkswirtschaft ( -1936 Gordon (1939) and Koch (2000) for an overview. The index prior to 1926 is described in detail in Eidgenössisches Arbeitsamt (1923) , the revised index in Bundesamt für Industrie, Gewerbe und Arbeit (1935) .
18 See Acklin (1939) and Balmer and Zurwerra (2000) for an overview.
fice (Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion) publishes these data since 1885. We use the Monatsstatistik des auswärtigen Handels der Schweiz, 1926 Schweiz, -1938 The solution of the model described in Section 2 leads to a non-linear system of expectational first-order difference equations, which we log-linearize around its deterministic steady state, before solving it using the method proposed by Klein (2000) . The solution of the model provides the policy functions, which can be written in state space form as
where x t is a 3 × 1 vector of observables (output, inflation, and net exports), and α t is the 2 × 1 unobservable state vector driven by the two structural shocks in ν t with variance Q. The model is of course a highly stylized representation of the Swiss economy in the 1930s. Therefore, we follow Ireland (2004) and incorporate a dynamic measurement error with a vector autoregressive (VAR) structure into the state vector to allow for off-model dynamics in the data:
The structure of the extended state space model is therefore
The setup allows to estimate the structural parameters of the model using Maximum Likelihood or Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We choose the Bayesian approach, since in this framework, it is straightforward to impose parameter restrictions using the prior distribution. The restrictions are necessary because there is no guarantee that the estimation algorithm results in parameter 19 All data are available on request.
estimates which make sense from an economic point of view. If this turns out to be too restrictive, the measurement error variance will dominate the variance of the structural model.
Lastly, we calibrate two structural parameters prior to the estimation exercise. In particular, we set the subjective discount factor β equal to the conventional value of 0.99 and the preference parameter γ equal to the import share of the Swiss economy during the period of investigation.
We impose uniform priors with reasonable ranges for the structural parameters to be as loose as possible (see Table 3 ). 20 To generate the parameter chain, we use the tailored randomized MCMC method proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy (2010) . The procedure is a modification of the standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (e.g. Chib and Greenberg, 1995) . In each simulation step, the parameters are randomly combined into blocks. A proposal draw is generated from a multivariate t-distribution with a scale matrix derived at the conditional maximum of the posterior. The proposal is accepted if the value of the posterior at the new parameters is higher than for the old parameters. If not, it is accepted with an acceptance probability drawn from a uniform distribution U (0, 1), to ensure that we find a global maximum.
Since our estimation approach requires stationary data, we detrend our time series prior to estimation. Furthermore, in all our time series we observe a strong seasonal pattern. Therefore, we also deseasonalize the time series before the estimation. In particular, for output we use the cyclical component of a quadratically detrended and X-12 21 deseasonalized time series. For net exports we use a demeaned and X-12 seasonally adjusted time series, while for inflation we use monthly growth rates of year-to-year differences of the consumer price index. Data plots of the time series used for estimation can be found in Appendix B.
20 For the VAR-component, we require that the maximum absolute eigenvalue of A is less than 0.6 to ensure that the persistence in the model comes from the structural shocks. In addition, the matrix Σ has to be positive semidefinite, and the maximum measurement error variance is not allowed to take values of more than 60 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable time series. This is similar to García-Cicco et al. (2010) , who restrict the measurement error variance "to absorb no more than 6 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable time series" (p. 2519). Since the vectorized variance covariance matrix of the VAR part is given by vec (Σ κ ) = (I 3 2 − A ⊗ A) vec (Σ), our choice is not overly restrictive.
21 Census Bureau's X-12 ARIMA procedure
Results
This section presents the results and findings of our estimation exercise. Unless otherwise mentioned, we focus on the results using SBB freight data as a proxy for output. However, occasionally we also complement our findings with result sets using silk or watch production instead of freight data.
Parameter Distributions
With the algorithm described in the previous section, we draw 400,000 replications, discarding the first 150,000 as burn-in. Geweke's χ 2 -test (4% taper) is used to assess convergence of the parameter chains (Geweke, 1992) . Results of the posterior distribution of the structural parameters 22 are presented in Table 3 and show a presence of high persistence in foreign demand, terms of trade, and prices. This finding underlines the fact that price rigidities seem to be an important feature of the Swiss economy at this time. 
Results are based on 400,000 draws, where the first 150,000 are discarded as burn-in draws. SBB freight data is used for industrial production.
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The decomposition of the forecast error variance, presented in Figure 7 of output and inflation shows that the structural model, even though being quite stylized, contributes a significant part to the dynamics in the data, especially in the long run.
Thus, we conclude that the choice of the model, though being quite stylized, turned out to be appropriate and well-suited for explaining macroeconomic fluctuations of the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period. Furthermore, the structural model is more important for inflation than for output -this demonstrates again that price rigidity is an important feature of the Swiss economy in this period. Inflation is mainly driven by movements in terms of trade both in the short and in the long run. Off-model dynamics are more important for output, which indicates that the model is not able to capture all the dynamics of this eventful period, especially in the short run. However, the structural part of the model becomes more and more important at longer horizons so that in the long run the measurement error only accounts for about 10 percent of the variation Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, watch production is used for industrial production.
in output. Regarding the two structural shocks, foreign demand is slightly more important than terms of trade in the the short run, which in turn becomes more important in the long run.
Figures 8 and 9 report the relative importance of the shocks in case we use silk or watch production as a proxy for output instead of SBB freight data. While the results reveal a worse model fit in general for these two specifications, we find qualitatively similar results for the forecast error variance decomposition. Hence, the importance of terms of trade turns out to be a robust finding. Another robust finding is the presence of severe price rigidities. Figure 10 depicts the distribution of the average duration of a price being effective implied by the estimated posterior distributions of ω. It reveals that independent of the choice of the output time series ω seemed to be rather high, which translates into a high degree of price stickiness. The remarkably high duration of prices being effective of the watches model is in line with an observed high degree of cartelization of the export sector as described in Section 2.
Price Rigidities

Estimated States
The 23 See Table 1 for the import and export shares of the main trading partners in this period. 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 − Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light-gray shaded area represents 95% probability bands, dark-gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands, black line represents median.
Figure 11: Estimated Exogenous States
Alleviating Price Rigidities
What would have been the implications for the Swiss economy of a lower degree of price stickiness? Would a policy intervention decreasing the degree of cartelization have been beneficial? We draw 5,000 times from the posterior distribution and set ω equal to a lower counterfactual value. As a consequence, firms are in this experiment allowed to reset their price level more frequently. We analyze two different scenarios:
(i) strong intervention (small ω): the average duration of prices being effective reduces from 182 to 50 months, and (ii) medium intervention (medium ω): the average duration of prices being effective reduces from 182 to 100 months. As a next step, we estimate the counterfactual level of output implied by the structural part of the model by generating counterfactual data. Figure 13 depicts the results and emphasizes the potential benefits of policies that reduce price rigidities. In particular, the extent to which the economy is exposed to cyclical fluctuations is significantly reduced with a lower ω. Hence, the severity of the Great Depression might have been amplified by the rise of corporatist policies. Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months.
Conlusion
As Choudhri and Kochin (1980) show, countries staying on gold, such as Netherlands, Belgium, Italy or Poland, faced a much more severe depression than the Scandinavian countries or Spain, which never returned to gold. The Gold Bloc countries stayed depressed, while the countries leaving gold early recovered by 1935 (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Campa, 1990; Bernanke and James, 1991; Eichen-green, 1992) . The main determinants for the timing of abandoning the gold parity were deflationary pressure, the existence of banking crises, the gold cover ratio, and the extent of trade integration (Wolf, 2007 (Wolf, , 2008 Finally, we detect a severe degree of price rigidity of the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period, which impeded an internal adjustment and therefore also contributed to a prolonged recession. • Demand Functions:
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Log Deviations 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 −1 −0.5 0 0.5
Log Deviations 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months. 
